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CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ADDICT:
CONVICTION BY FORCE OF HABIT
Michael R. Diamond*
IN 1962, the United States Supreme Court decided Robinson v.
California,' a case in which the imposition of criminal sanctions for a
"status offense," in this instance the status of drug addiction, was held
to be unconstitutional as an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
in contravention of the eighth amendment. However, Robinson gives
rise to essential questions concerning the criminal responsibility of the
addict which are not answered by the Court's decision. This article will
discuss such questions and will suggest solutions which originate in a
logical extension of the Robinson rationale and an expansion of the
traditional insanity defense.
Robinson arose under a California statute2 which made it a mis-
demeanor to be, among other things, "addicted to the use of narcotics."
Robinson was convicted upon evidence which indicated that he was
addicted to the use of narcotics but which failed to show any other overt
act made illegal by the statute. The evidence showed that Robinson was
not under the influence of narcotics at the time of his arrest 8 The
trial judge instructed the jury that it could convict upon a showing of
"status" or "chronic condition" and a general verdict of guilty was
returned. The case was affirmed in the Los Angeles County Superior
Court and Robinson appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Writing for the majority which reversed Robinson's conviction, Mr.
Justice Stewart stated: "[W]e deal with a statute which makes the
'status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender
may be prosecuted 'at any time before he reforms.' "I
* J.D. Fordham Law School 1969; L.L.M. New York University 1971; Mem-
ber New York and Federal District Bars; Director of Community Development
for Manhattan Legal Services.
1. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
2. In 1962 § 11721 of the Cal. Health and Safety Code (West 1962) read:
"No person shall use, or be under the influence of narcotics, or be addicted to the
use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a
person licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics." Conviction
carried a mandatory ninety-day jail sentence. This section was repealed by Cal.
Stats. 1972, c. 1407, § 2.
3. 370 U.S. at 662.
4. Id. at 666.
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The opinion equates addiction with disease' and notes that in the
state's brief " 'it is generally conceded that a narcotic addict, particularly
one addicted to the use of heroin, is in a state of mental and physical
illness. So is an alcoholic.' "6 Stewart then concluded:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it
a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with
a venereal disease .... But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a
law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtlessly be uni-
versally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.7
The majority's opinion was limited to the issue of "status" and did not
discuss the addict's criminal responsibility for crimes related to addiction.
The opinion stated that: "The broad power of a State to regulate the
narcotic drugs traffic within its borders is not here in issue .... [The right
to regulate such traffic] is too firmly established to be successfully called
in question."' Mr. Justice White dissented, saying:
I do not consider appellant's conviction to be a punishment for having an illness
or for simply being in some status or condition, but rather a conviction for the
regular, repeated or habitual use of narcotics immediately prior to his arrest and
in violation of the California law .... To find addiction in this case the jury had
to believe that appellant had frequently used narcotics in the recent past.9
Justice White concluded that the purpose of the statute was to circum-
vent California's own venue requirements where, as in this case, there
was no precise evidence as to the county in which drug use occurred. He
found that various overt acts which the state might legitimately prose-
cute1° were implicitly within the status of addiction and recognized the
logical consequences of holding otherwise:
The Fourteenth Amendment is today held to bar any prosecution for addiction
regardless of the degree or frequency of use, and the Court's opinion bristles
with indications of further consequences. If it is 'cruel and unusual punishment'
to convict appellant for addiction, it is difficult to understand why it would be
any less offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment to convict him for use. ...
5. The opinion cites articles in medical periodicals which discuss addiction
in newborn children to document the fact that addiction "is apparently an illness
which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily." Id. at 667 (footnote omit-
ted).
6. Id. at 667 n.8.
7. Id. at 666 (citation omitted).
8. Id. at 664 (citation omitted).
9. Id. at 686 (footnote omitted).
10. Id. at 686.
396 [Vol. I
CONVICTION BY FORCE OF HABIT
[The Court] has cast serious doubt upon the power of any State to forbid the
use of narcotics under threat of criminal punishment. . . . [T]he States, as well
as the Federal Government, are now on notice. They will have to await a final
answer in another case."'
In opting to affirm Robinson's conviction, Justice White rejected the
concept of status being a defense to a criminal prosecution when the
status is merely the product of a pattern of otherwise illegal behavior.
One might quarrel with Justice White by pointing out that once one
achieves the "status" of addiction, certain acts become largely functions
of the status and beyond the control of the addict; it is entirely possible
that the addict has already been punished for the initial "voluntary" acts
which led to his addiction. In addition, Justice White's argument that
punishment for addiction is really a means of punishing certain recent,
illegal acts such as using narcotics which maintain the addiction, and
consequently the status, fails to recognize the addict's special dilemma. 2
In effect, Robinson asks whether certain acts are not attributable to
the addict's status. However, despite Mr. Justice Stewart's caveat," the
opinion fails to discuss whether the addict might be immune from
criminal prosecution for acts which, if committed by a non-addict, would
inevitably result in prosecution.
To provide a structure for the discussion of this question it is neces-
ary to divide those acts committed by addicts into the categories of
"status acts" and "secondary acts." "Status acts" are those actions com-
mitted by the addict which are inherent to, and inseparable from, the
status of addiction. For example, the possession and use of drugs or the
addict's being under the influence of narcotics is critical to the very exis-
tence of the status-the addict is under a mental and physical com-
pulsion, created by this status, to continue performing the prohibited
acts.
This problem was discussed in Lloyd v. United States4 where the
court affirmed, per curiam, appellant's conviction for possession of
heroin. Appellant's petition for a rehearing en banc was denied, again in
11. Id. at 688-89.
12. If Justice White is implying that a state may prosecute all the illegal acts
inherent to a given status, there could be interesting ramifications with respect
to Mr. Justice Stewart's analogy. Could the state, for example, prosecute all un-
married persons who contracted venereal disease for the crime of fornication
upon a showing that the defendant did, in fact, have a venereal disease?
13. 'The broad power of a State to regulate the narcotic drugs traffic within
its borders is not here in issue." 370 U.S. at 664.
14. 343 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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a per curiam opinion. Chief Judge Bazelon dissented from the denial
of the petition, noting appellant's long history of addiction and that
appellant's arrest had followed his purchasing an amount of heroin
which was "no more than would be consumed by many addicts in a
period of one or two days."'15 Judge Bazelon synthesized the problem by
asking "whether punishment of an addict.., whose purchase and posses-
sion of narcotic drugs is explained entirely by his personal need for
repeated dosages of them, is cruel and unusual punishment."' 16 In partial
response to this question, he states:
On the one hand, the Robinson opinion is replete with dicta affirming the right
of the states to punish possession or actual use of narcotic drugs in unauthorized
situations. On the other, I am not able to distinguish in any meaningful sense
the punishment of an addict for being an addict and the punishment of an ad-
dict for buying and possessing the drugs his body compellingly craves.
17
Similarly, in Seattle v. Hill,'8 where appellant was a chronic alcoholic,
Chief Justice Finley wrote in dissenting to the court's affirmance of
appellant's conviction for public drunkenness: "I can see no rational
basis for disallowing punishment of individuals because they are ill
but approving their punishment for involuntarily exhibiting a symptom
of their illness."'"
The principle expressed in these dissenting opinions was accepted in
two United States court of appeals cases dealing with the public intoxica-
tion convictions of chronic alcoholics. In Easter v. District of Columbia"°
Judge Fahy, writing for the majority which reversed appellant's con-
viction, stated:
An essential element of criminal responsibility is the ability to avoid the conduct
specified in the definition of the crime. Action within the definition is not enough.
To be guilty of the crime a person must engage responsibly in the action.
One who is a chronic alcoholic cannot have the mens rea necessary to be held
responsible criminally for being drunk in public.2 '
15. Id. at 243.
16. Id. at 244 (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 245.
18. 72 Wash. 2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967). Although this case concerns a
chronic alcoholic, there are distinct similarities between a chronic alcoholic and
a heroin addict in terms of "status." While the possession of alcohol is generally
legal, both the alcoholic and the addict exhibit physical and mental dependency;
each has an overwhelming compulsion to continue use and each, without treat-
ment, will suffer distinct medical symptoms from discontinued use.
19. Id. at 816, 435 P.2d at 710 (Finley, J., dissenting).
20. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
21. Id. at 52-53.
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The court found that a 1947 statute" "demonstrat[ed] [congressional]
intention that the chronic alcoholic be subjected to civil processes when
found intoxicated in public, rather than convicted as a criminal .... 23
The court consequently held that the alcoholic charged with public
intoxication could use his condition as a defense.24
It is interesting to note that then Circuit Judge Burger concurred in
the result reached by the court but limited his opinion to the District of
Columbia statute in question and did not agree with the majority's con-
stitutional reasoning.25 Judge Burger joined Judge Danaher in a separate
concurring opinion in which Danaher said: "I share his [Judge
McGowan's] view [in another concurring opinion] that we have here
been asked to say that henceforth 'one charged with public drunkenness
may assert chronic alcoholism as a defense and introduce. evidence in
support of that defense.' ,26
In Driver v. Hinnant2T the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
termed alcoholism an "addiction" and made a similar analysis of the
responsibility of the "involuntary drinker. '28 This case is the more
widely quoted of the two and stands on a broader constitutional base.
Again appellant was convicted under a statute which made it illegal for
a person to be found drunk or intoxicated in a public place. It was not
disputed that Driver was a chronic alcoholic and the court noted that
he had been convicted of the same offense more than two hundred times
in the past. He had, in fact, been convicted twice after his release from
prison pending appeal. Judge Bryan, writing the opinion for the court,
stated:
[Driver's] argument may be condensed in this syllogism: Driver's chronic alcohol-
ism is a disease which has destroyed the power of his will to resist the constant,
excessive consumption of alcohol; his appearance in public in that condition is
not his volition, but a compulsion symptomatic of the disease; and to stigmatize
him as a criminal for this act is cruel and unusual punishment.
29
The court accepted Driver's argument and reversed his conviction
holding:
22. Act of Aug. 4, 1947, ch. 472, § 1, 61 Stat. 744, codified, D.C. Code Ann.
§ 24-501 (1967).
23. 316 F.2d at 51 n.2.
24. Id. at 51.
25. Id. at 61.
26. Id.
27. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
28. Id. at 764.
29. Id. at 763.
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The chronic alcoholic has not drunk voluntarily, although undoubtedly he did
so originally. His excess now derives from disease. However, our excusal of the
chronic alcoholic from criminal prosecution is confined exclusively to those acts
on his part which are compulsive as symptomatic of the disease. With respect to
other behavior-not characteristic of confirmed chronic alcoholism-he would be
judged as would any person not so afflicted.
Robinson v. State of California . . . sustains, if not commands, the view we
take.... The California statute criminally punished a "status"--drug addiction
[while] the North Carolina Act criminally punishes an involuntary symptom of a
status-public intoxication. 0
The court further noted that many chronic alcoholics have no home, and
no family or friends to care for them and asked whether it was any less
cruel to punish Driver for a public appearance than it would be to
punish him for his alcoholism. In a real sense, chance alone dictated
where Driver would eventually find himself after a drinking spree since
his presence in any given location could not be attributed to his rational
desire or intent. And given the fact that his disease compelled him to
drink to the point of losing control over his actions, one could hardly
say that he was sufficiently responsible for his actions so as to subject
him to the penalties of the criminal law.
The case of Powell v. Texas8 gave the Supreme Court an opportunity
to give "the final answer" to the questions evoked by Robinson and the
cases which followed it.82 However, the Court's decision did little to
clear up the muddied picture.
The Court was confronted with a chronic alcoholic appealing his
conviction under a public intoxication statute. Upon request of defense
counsel, and without objection by the prosecution, the trial court had
entered findings that Powell was a chronic alcoholic, and that alcoholism
is a disease which compels its victims to drink to excess and to frequent
public places when intoxicated. However, the trial judge ruled as a
matter of law that chronic alcoholism is not a defense to a charge of
public intoxication. At trial, the court accepted defendant's proposed
findings of fact; the Supreme Court majority, however, denied the validity
of such findings which it termed "premises of a syllogism transparently
designed to bring this case within the scope of this Court's opinion in
Robinson v. California.'88 The Court summarized its analysis of the
trial record by finding that:
30. Id. at 764-65. The court limits its holding to the chronic alcoholic whom
it terms "the addict-the involuntary drinker."
31. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
32. See 370 U.S. at 689 (dissenting opinion).
33. 392 U.S. at 521 (citation omitted).
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[T]he record in this case is utterly inadequate to permit the sort of informed and
responsible adjudication which alone can support the announcement of an im-
portant and wide-ranging new constitutional principle .... The trial hardly reflects
the sharp legal and evidentiary clash between fully prepared adversary litigants
which is traditionally expected in major constitutional cases.8 4
Appellant's conviction was affirmed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Mar-
shall who noted the current debate among medical authorities over the
nature of alcoholism and its treatment. Marshall expressed concern over
the indefinite sentence permissible in civil commitment for the disease of
alcoholism-the alcoholic is confined until "cured" without any assurance
that a cure will be effected. He then distinguished Powell from Robinson
by saying:
The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has
committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest
in preventing . . . . It thus does not deal with the question of whether certain
conduct can not constitutionally be punished because it is, in some sense, "in-
voluntary" or "occasioned by a compulsion."3
The fifth vote for the majority came in the form of a concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice White. As in the Robinson decision, he analogized
the narcotics problem to physical illness and its symptoms:
If it can not be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics ... I do
not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to yield to such a compulsion.
Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for addiction under a different name.
Distinguishing between the two crimes is like forbidding criminal conviction for
being sick with flu or epilepsy but permitting punishment for running a fever
or having a convulsion. Unless Robinson is to be abandoned, the use of narcotics
by an addict must be beyond the reach of the criminal law. Similarly, the chronic
alcoholic with an irresistible urge to consume alcohol should not be punishable
for drinking or for being drunk. 0
White attacked the trial record by finding that it was insufficient to
support the conclusion that "Powell was a chronic alcoholic with a com-
pulsion not only to drink to excess but also to frequent public places
when intoxicated."8" White's analysis was influenced by the fact that
Powell was in a public place and that the record failed to show either
that he had nowhere else to go or that he was so drunk that "he had lost
control of his movements.""8 In either case, "[t]he Eighth Amendment
34. Id. at 521-22.
35. Id. at 533.
36. Id. at 548-49.
37. Id. at 549.
38. Id. at 553. Mr. Justice White discusses the findings of the trial court and
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might also forbid conviction ... but only on a record satisfactorily show-
ing that it was not feasible for him to have made arrangements to prevent
his being in public when drunk and that his extreme drunkenness
sufficiently deprived him of his faculties on the occasion in issue."3' 9
The record before the Court did not satisfy those prerequisites. How-
ever, White concludes that even if accepted, the defendant's theory
would not have radical consequences:
In the first place, when as here the crime charged was being drunk in a public
place, only the compulsive chronic alcoholic would have a defense to both
elements of the crime-for his drunkenness because his disease compelled him to
drink and for being in a public place because the force of circumstances or
excessive intoxication sufficiently deprived him of his mental and physical
powers .... Concerning drugs, such a construction of the Eighth Amendment
would bar conviction only where the drug is addictive and then only for acts
which are a necessary part of the addiction, such as simple use. Beyond that it
would preclude punishment only when the addiction to or the use of drugs caused
sufficient loss of physical and mental faculties. 40
Four justices dissented to the decision including Mr. Justice Fortas
who said:
Criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition
he is powerless to change. . . . [The essential constitutional defect here is the
same as in Robinson, for in both cases the particular defendant was accused of
being in a condition which he had no capacity to change or avoid . . . . [A]
person may not be punished if the condition essential to constitute the defined
crime is part of the pattern of his disease and is occasioned by a compulsion
symptomatic of the disease. 41
The majority and concurring opinions in Powell were unwilling to
base an extension of the constitutional principles enunciated in Robinson
on the sparse record of the lower court. The dissent, however, found
Robinson applicable. The result of this division is that far from being
a "final answer," Powell gives no conclusive answers and merely confuses
the issues presented in Robinson.
A similar conclusion was reached in Watson v. United States, 4 a case
decided en banc by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
states that they did not represent a well-considered and well-supported judgment
and that he would disregard them as insufficient upon which to rest a constitu-
tional adjudication.
39. Id. at 552.
40. Id. at 552 n.4.
41. Id. at 567-69 (dissenting opinion).
42. 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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of Columbia. In that case, appellant was a drug addict convicted under
two federal statutes s of having "'purchased, sold, dispensed, and dis-
tributed, not in the original stamped package and not from the original
stamped package, a narcotic drug' "" and having "facilitated the con-
cealment and sale of a narcotic drug . . . after said [drug] had been
imported into the United States contrary to law, with the knowledge of
[appellant]. 45
Appellant was arrested in his apartment after police, acting pursuant
to a valid search warrant, found thirteen capsules of heroin which
amounted to approximately half of Watson's daily usage. Appellant
pleaded insanity, but the jury returned a verdict of guilty. He appealed on
the ground that "if the insanity defense was unavailing, there was a
failure of due process in the law's omission to provide a defense of
involuntariness derived from the compulsions of his addiction," or that
Robinson prohibited, under the eighth amendment, the mandatory sen-
tence imposed upon conviction.4
Before the issue was resolved, the court, on its own motion, placed the
appeal en banc. At this point, amicus curiae filed a brief and participated
in oral argument. In their brief amicus curiae argued that:
43. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 550 and Act of July 18, 1956,
ch. 629, § 105, 70 Stat. 570. The second statute has been reenacted as 21 U.S.C.
§§ 960(a) (b), 963, 885(b), 965 (1970).
44. 439 F.2d at 444. The statute then in force provided that: "It shall be
unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute narcotic drugs
except in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package; and
the absence of appropriate taxpaid stamps from narcotic drugs shall be prima facie
evidence of a violation of this subsection by the person in whose possession the
same may be found." Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 550.
45. 439 F.2d at 444. The language of the indictment was also based on Act
of July 18, 1956, ch. 624, tit. I, § 105, 70 Stat. 570, which stated in part: "Who-
ever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any narcotic drug into the
United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction, contrary to law,
or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation,
concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug after being imported or brought
in, knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States
contrary to law, or conspires to commit any of such acts in violation of the laws
of the United States, shall be imprisoned....
Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection the defendant is shown to
have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains
the possession to the satisfaction of the jury."
46. 439 F.2d at 447.
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(1) Robinson interposed a constitutional barrier to any criminal punishment of
an addict who, like appellant, was found in possession of a small amount of
heroin consistent with his own daily usage, (2) the availability of the familiar
insanity defense falls short of bridging the constitutional gap opened in the law
by Robinson .... 47
Noting the serious questions 48 raised by Powell, the court declined
to formulate "a new test of criminal responsibility for narcotic addicts
which departs significantly from the existing insanity defense. '4 9 Accord-
ing to the court's interpretation, appellant was not charged with posses-
sion as such, but with the "purchasing, selling, dispensing or distributing"
of narcotics without the proper stamps. The statute states that possession
without the necessary stamps is prima facie evidence of violating the
statute. Similarly, the second count charged illegally importing or know-
ingly facilitating the receiving, concealing, buying or selling of an
illegally imported drug. Again, mere possession is sufficient to convict
unless such possession is satisfactorily explained to the jury. Therefore,
proof of possession alone could lead to conviction on any of several
charges.
The effect of all this is that the non-addict dealer in large quantities of narcotics is,
for purposes of substantive violations, lumped with the addict who possesses
narcotics solely for his own use. Of course it is true that, as a practical matter, no
addict can possess narcotics without buying, receiving, or concealing them-acts
which... are "realistically inseparable from the status of addiction." So it is that,
if Robinson's deployment of the Eighth Amendment as a barrier to California's
making addiction a crime means anything, it must also mean in all logic that (1)
Congress either did not intend to expose the non-trafficking addict possessor to
criminal punishment, or (2) its effort to do so is as unavailing constitutionally
as that of the California legislature. 5°
The court, however, refused to resolve the appeal in those terms because
it felt that an appellant had to raise such issues "clearly and un-
47. Id. at 449.
48. The court noted that the traditional insanity defense argued at trial was
derived from the eighth amendment. However, "[t]he Supreme Court in Powell
has left this matter of criminal responsibility, as affected by the Eighth Amend-
ment, in a posture which is, at best, obscure. The majority in that case unmistak-
ably recoiled from opening up new avenues of escape from criminal accountability
by reason of the compulsions of such things as alcoholism and, presumably, drug
addiction.... Powell at the least contemplates a heavy burden of proof on one
who claims to the contrary, and this record finds appellant short of discharging
that burden." Id. at 451.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 452.
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equivocally" at trial and this was "far from being the case in this in-
stance."5
Accepting a suggestion by amicus curiae, the court noted that in the
future a defendant might move to dismiss the indictment on the grounds
that the statute implicitly excluded a non-trafficking addict possessing
narcotics for his personal use; in the alternative, a defendant's motion
would argue the unconstitutionality of the statute under Robinson. Ob-
viously, such arguments would constitute affirmative defenses at trial,
but absent a record containing findings of fact "sufficiently close in point
of time to the events in question as to assure its integrity, '5 2 the court
can make no definitive ruling. This is, said the court "the only way by
which the Supreme Court can ...be effectively entreated to explain,
more fully than it has done so far, how it is that California may not,
consistently with the Federal Constitution, prosecute a person for being
an addict, but the United States can criminally prosecute an addict for
possession of narcotics for his personal use. '53 While Watson's conviction
was affirmed, his sentence was vacated and the case was remanded with
instructions that the court consider Watson's eligibility for non-criminal
disposition under the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act.
Chief Judge Bazelon concurred in part and dissented in part, saying:
The majority opinion, it seems to me, stands for the proposition that when
the issue is next before us, we will be compelled to hold that those provisions of
the federal narcotics laws involved in this case do not apply to a narcotics addict,
not trafficking in narcotics, who [has violated them,] so long as the narcotics
involved are for the addict's own use. Likewise, today's decision would appear
to compel the conclusion that, when these acts are engaged in even by an addict
who trafficks in narcotics, Robinson v. California makes unavailing any attempt
to apply these statutes to him.5 4
Bazelon discussed the holding in Powell and found that "no member of
that Court expressed the slightest disagreement with what I had thought
to be the self-evident proposition that the Eighth Amendment's proscrip-
tion of cruel and unusual punishments should provide the floor rather
than the ceiling for the development of doctrines of criminal responsi-
bility. In my view, Powell should be read not as a bar, but as an exhorta-
tion toward further experiment with common-law doctrines of criminal
51. Id. at 453.
52. Id. at 454.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 458 (footnotes omitted). In a note to his opinion, Judge Bazelon
states that he cannot understand how the issue of trafficking can be critical when
the defendant is an addict charged with possession. Id. at n.6.
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responsibility. ' 55 Bazelon believed that the Watson case presented a
proper vehicle for such a re-examination which should take place largely
independent of the eighth amendment.
This article has thus far examined addiction as a "status" and at-
tempted to show that certain acts are endemic to that status and should
be protected from criminal sanctions under an extension of the reasoning
set forth in the Robinson case. The discussion was largely concerned
with the eighth amendment and its relationship to status; however, as
Chief Judge Bazelon argued in Watson, the eighth amendment should
provide a floor rather than a ceiling for the discussion of criminal respon-
sibility.
When speaking of the addict and the criminal acts he commits, the
discussion of responsibility encompasses both his status acts as well as
his secondary acts-those acts which are caused by the addiction but are
other than violations of the narcotics laws, as, for example, stealing to
obtain money to buy drugs. However, from the previous discussion of
Robinson and similar cases, it should be obvious that the "status" defense
has not yet been sufficiently extended to cover secondary acts. It will be
necessary, therefore, to consider the traditional insanity defense to see
whether it will be sufficient to protect the addict. In general, any discus-
sion of a person's legal responsibility for particular acts revolves around
that person's "sanity." Although there are other factors0 which can
55. Id. at 459.
56. Two such factors are intoxication and duress. The general rule with re-
spect to voluntary intoxication as a defense is that it will not lessen criminal
responsibility. However, intoxication may be shown to negate the existence of a
specific intent in crimes requiring such an intent. There are also cases which hold
that intoxication over a long period which results in a fixed insanity may relieve
a defendant of responsibility. In McIntyre v. Alaska, 379 P.2d 615 (Sup. Ct.
Alas. 1963), the court held that "[a] state of mind created by voluntary intoxica-
tion ... is not a major mental disorder or disease or mental derangement which
amounts to legal insanity. The majority of courts have drawn a distinction be-
tween (1) the mental effect of intoxication, which is the immediate result of a
particular alcoholic bout; and (2) an alcoholic psychosis, such as delirium trem-
ens, resulting from long continued habits of excessive drinking. The former does
not amount to legal insanity, whereas the latter may." Id. at 616 (footnotes
omitted).
The duress argument was made in Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) where Castle, an addict, was convicted of possession of narcotics.
Among his defenses, Castle claimed his addiction amounted to "pharmacological
duress" which relieved him of responsibility. The court accepted duress as a de-
fense but never reached the merits of the contention disposing of it on proce-
dural grounds. The issue remains undecided.
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contribute to finding a person not responsible for acts he commits, these
are of lesser significance.
The current, and long established, test for insanity comes from
M'Naghten's Case, decided in 1843. 57 In that case, M'Naghten pleaded
not guilty to a murder charge, claiming as a defense that at the time
of the murder he was not "in a sound state of mind." The rule of law
announced at that time concluded:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong.5 8
This test, although still the law in most American jurisdictions, has
undergone a great deal of criticism. The fact that it relies on the actor's
cognitive capacity to determine his responsibility ignores psychological
realities: a person will often realize that his actions were unlawful or
"wrong" and yet be unable to refrain from doing those very acts.
An attempt was made to circumvent the M'Naghten absolute in Smith
v. United States,59 which articulated the so-called "irresistible impulse"
test. The decision held that a defendant was not responsible if his act
was the result of an irresistible impulse, where the impulse was "such as
to override the reason and judgment and obliterate the sense of right
and wrong to the extent that the accused is deprived of the power to
choose between right and wrong. The mere ability to distinguish right
from wrong is no longer the correct test.., where the defense of insanity
is interposed."6
This test, too, has been subject to criticism, primarily because it
implicitly requires that the alleged criminal acts be the sudden, spon-
taneous manifestation of the mental illness. That the impulse might be
the result of long-term brooding or melancholia is completely discounted;
in that respect the standard seems to ignore modem psychological knowl-
edge.
New criteria were needed, but it was not until 1954 in Durham v.
United States61 that a court made the necessary innovations. In Durham
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that "an accused
57. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
58. Id. at 722.
59. 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
60. Id. at 549.
61. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect. '62 This test removes the cognitive
element of M'Naghten and the spontaneous impulse problem of Smith.
It allows an expert witness to discuss the defendant without discussing
psychological irrelevancies such as whether defendant knew his action
to be "right" or "wrong." Durham was supplemented in turn by McDonald
v. United States68 which held that whether expert testimony had suf-
ficient weight and credibility to overcome the presumption of sanity was
a question for the jury.6 4 The McDonald court concluded that it must
be governed by a judicial, and not a medical, definition of insanity,
and that neither the court nor the jury is bound by the definitions or
conclusions of an expert as to what constitutes a disease or defect. The
court asserted that "the jury should be told that a mental disease or
defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially
affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior
controls."65
Although the Durham/McDonald test represented both a radical
deviation from M'Naghten and a substantial improvement, it was not
Without significant problems. In one respect, Durham followed the ir-
resistible impulse formula in looking for one causal connection between
a defendant's act and his mental disorder. The Durham position is well
stated in Carter v. United States6 where the court held:
The simple fact that a person has a mental disease or defect is not enough to
relieve him of responsibility for a crime. There must be a relationship between
the disease and the criminal act; and the relationship must be such as to justify
a reasonable inference that the act would not have been committed if the person
had not been suffering from the disease. There are two key factors in this
defense, (1) a mental disease and (2) a critical relationship between that disease
and the alleged criminal act.
By "critical" we mean decisive, determinative, causal; we mean to convey the
idea inherent in the phrases "because of", "except for", "without which", "but
for", "effect of", "result of", "causitive factor"; the disease made the effective or
decisive difference betwen doing and not doing the act.67
Under this test, the expert is asked to state whether a specific mental
62. Id. at 874-75.
63. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
64. Id. at 850.
65. Id. at 851.
66. 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
67. Id. at 615-17 (footnote omitted).
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problem caused the defendant to commit a particular act which, were
the disease or defect not present, would not have been committed.6 s
Addison M. Bowman, an attorney with the Washington, D.C. Legal
Aid Agency, has noted, however, that whether an act is the product of
some mental disease is a question which can be answered in the affirma-
tive or not at all.69 The psychological complexities of the human mind
make this question unrealistic and all but impossible for the expert to
answer with assurance. Admittedly the Carter court rejected the use of
"unexplained medical terms" and simplistic, single-word analyses ;70 how-
ever, the court's test required that the expert show a direct relation
between cause and effect, which requirement could encourage a simplistic
conclusion.
In 1962, the final draft of the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code was presented. Section 4.01 (1) dealing with criminal responsibility
states:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to ap-
preciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law. 71
Thus, the Code has rejected the rigid tests of the past and substituted a
test which considers the actor's ability to control his behavior: this stan-
dard rejects absolutism and instead considers "substantial" capacity.
The comments to a tentative draft of the Code72 concluded:
The draft accepts the view that any effort to exclude the non-deterrables from
strictly penal sanctions must take account of the impairment of volitional capacity
no less than of impairment of cognition; and that this result should be achieved
directly in the formulation of the test rather than left to mitigation in the appli-
cation of M'Naghten. It also accepts the criticism of the "irresistible impulse"
formulation as inept in so far as it may be impliedly restricted to sudden, spon-
taneous acts as distinguished from insane propulsions that are accompanied by
brooding or reflection. 7s
This test has special significance when applied to addicts. Under
M'Naghten, the courts were solely concerned with cognition. However,
it is arguable that the large majority of addicts are aware of the illegality
68. Id. at 617-18.
69. Bowman, Narcotics Addiction and Criminal Responsibility Under Dur-
ham, 53 Geo. L.J. 1017, 1026 (1965).
70. 252 F.2d at 617.
71. ALI Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) (1962 Proposed Official Draft).
72. ALI Model Penal Code, 1955 Tentative Draft No. 4.
73. Id. at 157.
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of the criminal acts associated with addiction. Moreover, crime may be
the only source of money sufficient to support the addict's physical
craving. In effect, the addict cannot act otherwise despite his recognition
of the illegality of his actions. As Lionel Frankel has said:
[Tihe dominant symptom of addiction seems to be the incapacity of the addict
to abstain from using drugs despite the strongest motives and wishes to abstain.
In a very real sense the confirmed addict lacks the capacity to discontinue using
narcotics. He can no longer choose not to be an addict. For this reason, there is a
serious question whether it is either efficacious or just to punish an addict for
conduct which he cannot, by reason of his addiction, keep himself from com-
mitting.74
When charged with a violation of narcotics laws, the defendant in
Horton v. United States75 pleaded addiction-related insanity. Because
of significant discrepancies in the testimony of six psychiatrists, the
question of defendant's criminal responsibility was presented to the jury.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit remanded, finding error in
a remark by the trial judge that defendant was competent to stand trial.
In effect, the trial judge had violated the federal statute which requires
a mental examination to determine competence, but holds that the
results of that examination shall not be made known to the jury. 7 Five
psychiatrists submitted a brief on behalf of appellant which stated in
part that "[t]he main issue should have been not what causes addiction,
but how the addiction, once established, affects its victims. ' 77 The same
result was reached in Brown v. United StatesZ8 where the defendant was
an addict convicted of violating federal narcotics laws. Citing Horton
the appeals court said that "[t]he defense of insanity based on drug
addiction generally presents a jury issue as to criminal responsibility....
The trier of fact must decide whether the defendant had a mental dis-
ability and, if so, whether his act was the product thereof. 79
In Heard v. United States0 the court reached a contrary conclusion.
Heard, an addict, had been charged with selling narcotics. He pleaded
74. Frankel, Narcotics Addiction, Criminal Responsibility and Civil Com-
mitment, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 581, 587 (footnotes omitted).
75. 317 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
76. Id. at 596. The statute is 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
77. Brief submitted by Dr. Kolb and joined by Drs. Modlin, Overholser,
Salzman and Satlen at 4. Dr. Kolb is Director of New York Psychiatric Institute,
Professor and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at Columbia Univer-
sity and Director of Psychiatric Services, Presbyterian Hospital.
78. 331 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
79. Id. at 823.
80. 348 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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insanity and requested jury instructions on criminal responsibility and its
relation to addiction. The request was denied and Heard was convicted.
In affirming the conviction, the court of appeals stated:
We hold only that a mere showing of narcotics addiction, without more, does not
constitute "some evidence" of mental disease or "insanity" so as to raise the issue
of criminal responsibility. This is not to say that evidence that an accused is an
addict is without probative value along with other evidence on the issue of responsi-
bility but only that alone it is not sufficient to require giving the Durham-
McDonald instruction.8 '
The court reiterated its definition of mental disease or defect as being
"an abnormal condition of the mind which substantially impairs capacity
to control behavior, '82 and held that while under the influence of
narcotics Heard's ability to control his behavior was not impaired. How-
ever, when deprived of drugs, Heard might be unable to exercise control.
The court found no evidence that, at the time of his arrest, Heard
needed a fix.83
Judge Wright dissented, claiming that addiction raised a question of
cause and effect and that in the instant case expert testimony indicated
that Heard's mental and emotional processes, as well as his behavior
controls, were impaired by chronic drug use. He concluded that evidence
of addiction was sufficient to give the case to the jury despite the absence
of any evidence that Heard acted under the influence of, or need for,
drugs.
Chief Judge Bazelon supported appellant's petition for a rehearing
en banc. He agreed with Judge Wright that sufficient evidence was pre-
sented so as to require jury instructions on the issue of responsibility:
"Indeed, the general medical consensus is that an established addiction
process is a significant symptom of mental disease."84
Although these former cases were decided under the Durham/Mc-
Donald rule rather than the Model Penal Code, the question of underly-
ing mental disease or defect must be decided before the defense of insanity
can prevail. 5 Various authorities have supported the conclusion that
81. Id. at 44.
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 46.
84. Id. at 49 (footnotes omitted).
85. The "insanity defense" as currently interpreted faces a congressional chal-
lenge. S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) proposes amendments to title 18 of
the United States Code including a curtailment of the insanity defense. § 502
states: "It is a defense to a prosecution under a federal statute that the defendant,
as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the state of mind required as an
element of the offense charged. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise con-
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addiction is symptomatic of underlying mental disease. Dr. J. L. Chapel
has written that "[a] drug or chemical is harmless unless it has a suscepti-
ble host. The individual likely to become addicted is susceptible by virtue
of a character defect, a neurotic disability or other psychiatric involve-
ment." ' And Dr. Raskin has found that "[a]ddiction is a medical syn-
drome, a symptom complex, invariably reflecting some form of
underlying mental disorder. The addict is a person suffering from a
serious mental or emotional disturbance and manifests this disturbance
in great part through his craving for and relationship to the drug."'
Addiction is intimately related to the issue of criminal responsibility.
The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual classifies narcotic addiction as a mental disorder. 8 Moreover,
the President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic Drug Abuse reported:
All [narcotic drugs] profoundly affect the central nervous system and the mind.
The effects produced by taking these drugs is [sic] primarily on the brain....
[T]he drugs are psychotoxic. A psychotoxic drug is any chemical substance cap-
able of adducing effects which lead to abnormal behavior. They effect or alter to
a substantive extent consciousness, the ability to think, critical judgment, moti-
vation, psychomotor coordination and sensory perception. 89
Another significant research finding is that the addict suffers "the effects
of repeated actions of a drug such that its use becomes necessary and
cessation of its action causes mental and physical disturbances." 90 Here,
the critical language concerns the necessity of use: while drug use
prevents the occurrence of withdrawal symptoms, the addict also "bene-
fits" from "[t]he drugs' capacity to reduce frustration and anxiety and
to induce a feeling of pleasure and mastery, [which] is far more sig-
nificant than the physiological effects of the drug."9'
In addition, as the addict uses narcotics, he builds a tolerance to
them so that he requires increasing doses to satisfy his habit. Inevitably,
stitute a defense." McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1962). This formulation puts the Durham/McDonald rule substantially in con-
formity with ALI Model Penal Code § 4.01 (1962 Proposed Official Draft).
86. J.L. Chapel, Drugs for Kicks, 16 Crime and Delinquency 1 (1970).
87. Dr. H. Raskin, Statement before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-
gation of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 5, at 1300 (1964).
88. Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics, American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, Mental Disorders at 39 (1952).
89. President's Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse (1963).
90. Goth, Medical Pharmacology (5th ed. 1970) at 273 (emphasis added).
91. Chapman, Methods of Treatment and Management of Drug Addiction.
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according to Dr. Douglas Goldman, this has a negative effect on
society:
The addiction phenomenon is of social and legal importance because it is associ-
ated with various kinds of deviant behavior with or without actual drug intoxica-
tion, and because the addiction phenomenon enslaves the individual involved to
the point of committing severe offenses-robbery and even murder-to be able
to continue the purchase of the addicting drug.92
Dr. Goldman believes that the effects of addiction, such as the loss of
social judgment, raise serious questions about the addict's legal respon-
sibility.
A case which grapples with the specific question of whether an addict
can be responsible for crimes he commits to assure a continued supply
of narcotics is Hightower v. United States9 3 Hightower, an addict, was
arrested and charged with stealing five suits from a department store
and then assaulting a store detective who apprehended him. He pleaded
insanity, but the court, sitting without a jury, found him guilty.
Expert testimony by Dr. Dorothy S. Dobbs, a St. Elizabeth Hospital
staff psychiatrist, indicated that Hightower had an "emotionally unstable
personality" which Dr. Dobbs classified as a mental illness or mental
disease. She said that Hightower's addiction stemmed from "'extreme
anxiety, tension, feelings of inadequacy, particularly around other peo-
ple, and of depression.' "' Such feelings were apparently relieved by use
of heroin, and the psychiatrist noted a progression from the defendant's
emotional condition to the relief provided by the heroin, his addiction,
the need for money to support the drug habit and his attempted theft.
This analysis was generally corroborated by Dr. Hamman, a second
defense expert. The court, however, classified Dr. Dobbs' findings as an
assumption: "There is no factual evidence in this case-as distinguished
from conclusory opinion-that appellant's drug addiction caused him to
commit the theft and the assault here involved."95
There was no testimony as to whether Hightower was an addict at
the time of the crime. In affirming Hightower's conviction, the court
noted that:
A trier of fact could perhaps assume some of the foregoing things without any
specific proof .... But the trier of fact in this case was not bound to make any
92. Goldman, Relationships of Social Activity, Work Capacity, Responsibility
and Competence to Drug Effects, 122 J. For. Sci. 431, 435-36 (1967).
93. 325 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
94. Id. at 617.
95. Id. at 618.
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such assumptions, or to accept the general and conclusory assumptions of the
psychiatrists as representing the actual facts in this case. The judge was thus not
compelled as a matter of law to have a reasonable doubt as to the element of
causation . ".. ,90
In his dissent, Judge Fahy stated that based upon the evidence presented,
the government had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that High-
tower was not suffering from a mental disease or defect or that if he
was, that the crime was not a product thereof.
The special significance of this case lies in the fact that none of the
several judges involved in its trial and appeal challenged the application
of the insanity defense to an addict charged with secondary crimes if it
were shown that the crime was committed to obtain money to purchase
drugs for his own use. Instead, the court ruled that Hightower had not
established the factual elements necessary to support the defense. Even
in affirming Hightower's conviction, the court clearly did not foreclose
the possibility that the argument urged by appellant could be successful
provided that its proponent established the necessary factual connections.
In 1966, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided United
States v. Freeman, 7 another case which dealt with the secondary acts
of addicts. Although the opinion written by Judge Kaufman first notes
the growing complexity and sophistication of the criminal law, it adds:
At the same time, however, there are a small number of more basic questions ...
so fundamental to the very notion of criminal justice that they must continue to
be asked-and, insofar as possible, answered-if the criminal law is truly to reflect
the moral sense of the community. This appeal poses one of those questions. 8
The question asks what standard is to be applied in determining issues of
criminal responsibility. Here, appellant was an addict charged with sell-
ing heroin to an undercover agent. His principal defense was his lack
of capacity and criminal responsibility. The trial judge, sitting without a
jury, applied the M'Naghten rules (supplemented by the irresistible im-
pulse test) and found Freeman guilty. At trial, an expert witness for the
defense noted that Freeman was not only a heroin addict (for a period
of about fourteen years) but was also a chronic alcoholic. This witness
testified that due to the long continued use of impure heroin, Freeman
suffered from frequent bouts of toxic psychosis (clouding of the senses),
as well as "delusions, hallucinations, epileptic convulsions and . . .
amnesia." 99
96. Id. at 618-19.
97. 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
98. Id. at 607-08.
99. Id. at 610 (footnote omitted).
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After further recitation from the trial record, the court discussed the
antecedents and development of the M'Naghten rule. The opinion pointed
out various criticisms of the test-the narrowness of its scope, the strict
limitations placed on expert testimony, and its emphasis on the ability of
the defendant to distinguish between right and wrong, which has been
discredited by modem psychiatry: "When the law limits a testifying
psychiatrist to stating his opinion whether the accused is capable of
knowing right from wrong, the expert is thereby compelled to test guilt
or innocence by a concept which bears little relationship to reality.' 00
However, the court said that neither the tremendous growth of
psychiatric knowledge since the announcement of the M'Naghten rule
nor the heavy criticism of the test were of themselves sufficient reason to
change the rule: "The true vice of M'Naghten is not, therefore, that
psychiatrists will feel constricted in artificially structuring their testimony
but rather that the ultimate deciders-the judge or the jury-will be
deprived of information vital to their final judgment."'' 1 The court con-
cluded that the question of a man's criminal responsibility is a "legal,
social or moral,"'"" not a medical question. The expert should furnish
the raw information upon which the judgment is based.
After tracing judicial attempts to deal with the problems of
M'Naghten, the court turned to the formulation found in the Model
Penal Code.1 3 Unlike M'Naghten, the Code views the mind as an inte-
grated whole where a defect or disease may impair its functioning in
numerous ways. It recognizes degrees and gradations of capacity and
replaces the limited concept of "knows" with the broader and more
relevant "appreciates." Of at least equal significance is the fact that it
gives the expert a structured freedom to explore and discuss the defen-
dant's entire psychological and emotional makeup. Both the expert and
the jury have clear standards within which to perform their functions.
Noting that the Model Penal Code's test "makes no pretension at
being the ultimate in faultless definition [but] is an infinite improvement
over the M'Naghten Rules," °4 the court accepted this test as the standard
for the circuit, reversed Freeman's conviction and remanded the case for
trial using the Code as the criteria to determine Freeman's responsibility.
The court emphasized, however, that a mere showing of addiction, like
100. Id. at 619.
101. Id. at 620.
102. Id. at 619.
103. Model Penal Code supra note 71.
104. 357 F.2d at 624.
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a mere showing of repeated criminal behavior, would not be sufficient
for acquittal on the basis of insanity.'05
Freeman is important because of the court's thorough examination of
the role and development of the insanity defense. The court pointed
out the shortcomings of each test discussed and concluded that given
the present state of scientific knowledge, and recognizing that the ques-
tion of criminal responsibility must be decided by society as represented
by the jury, the existing criteria must be replaced. In lieu of the various
formulae, it substitutes the Model Penal Code as giving greater weight to
those factors the court finds relevant. However, of equal significance is
the fact that this case applies the Code to secondary acts of the addict-
defendant: Freeman's conviction for sale to an undercover agent was
reversed and remanded in accordance with the Code's standard.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger has been a strong proponent of this position,
and of a test of responsibility based on the actor's cognition and ability
to control behavior which leaves the final decision in the hands of the
jury rather than with the experts. In Blocker v. United States, °6 Burger,
then a circuit judge, wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated his
approach. 10 7
The accepted standard of responsibility in the District of Columbia
was the Durham rule which relieved the defendant of responsibility if
his act were the "product" of mental disease. Burger criticized this formu-
lation because it established the psychiatric theory then current as a rule
of law. Given the possibility, if not the probability, of rapid change in
such theory, the effect of the rule according to Burger, was to usurp the
role of the jury and to establish the psychiatrist as the actual finder of
fact with respect to the defendant's responsibility.
What happens, typically, is that the expert will testify that the defen-
dant does, or does not, have a mental disease. However, this is also the
question presented to the jury.
[Tlhe problem is one of the soundness of a rule whose very terms encourage if
not require the experts to state conclusions in the terms of the ultimate issue....
We emphasize that we would bar these opinions not because they are conclusions,
but because they are, in this context and for these purposes, conclusions of law,
for which the psychiatrist has no competence .... Excluding such "conclusions"
105. Id. at 625.
106. 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
107. "No test for criminal responsibility can be adequate if it does not place
squarely before the jury the elements of cognition and capacity to control be-
havior." Id. at 867.
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expressed in the same terms as the ultimate jury question seems to me the only
safeguard to avoid transferring the jury function to experts .... 108
To balance the rule, however, the courts should give the expert
latitude to describe his findings in his own terms. 10 9 It is evident that
"[ilt is the explanation of the abnormality, not its name, that is impor-
tant."110 The expert should explain the forces, drives and compulsions
which affect the abnormal personality. Burger reasons that the critical
question is whether the actor understood his wrongdoing and, if so,
whether he had the capacity to exercise free will in the matter. A basic
postulate of American law is that to be responsible, one must be "'a free
agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong
and choosing freely to do wrong.' "11 If an actor is not a free agent ca-
pable of understanding the difference between right and wrong, capable
of choosing between them and acting freely on his choice he is then, by
definition, not criminally responsible.
Burger proposed these views and cited alternatives to the Durham
rule which, he believed, did not encompass this definition of criminal
responsibility. Among the alternatives he suggested were the early
Alabama rule,"' a formulation proposed by the District of Columbia
Bar Association's Committee on Criminal Responsibility"' and section
108. Id. at 863-64 (footnote omitted).
109. With respect to this problem, Burger finds that "a distinction must be
made between permitting experts to describe the diagnosis, as we should, and
making a particular diagnosis, i.e., 'mental disease', the threshold fact question
for the jury." Id. at 862 n.14.
110. Idat864.
111. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (citations
omitted).
112. 288 F.2d at 869 n.29 which quotes Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 596-97,
2 So. 854, 866-67 (1887): "Was the defendant at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, as a matter of fact, afflicted with a disease of the mind, so as to
be either idiotic or otherwise insane? . . . If such be the case, did he know right
from wrong, as applied to the particular act in question? If he did not have such
knowledge, he is not legally responsible .... If he did have such knowledge, he
may nevertheless not be legally responsible if the two following conditions con-
cur: (1) If, by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost
the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act
in question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed; (2) and if, at the
same time, the alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the
relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely." (emphasis
omitted).
113. 288 F.2d at 870, quoting 26 J.B.A. D.C. 301 (1959) which stated:
"The jury shall be .. .instructed that the defendant is not mentally responsible
if at the time of the alleged offense the defendant, because of an impaired or de-
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4.01 of the Model Penal Code. He also suggested his own formulation
which does not differ substantially from the American Law Institute's
test recently adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit." 4
The propositions offered by the Chief Justice can be applied to the
addict and his criminal acts. First, it is possible to speak in terms of the
addict's free will both in relation to his initial use of drugs (and subse-
quent addiction) and his addiction-related acts. As has been noted, there
is evidence and expert opinion to support the contention that the use
of drugs is the result of underlying psychological distress. It is also clear
that certain of the addict's criminal acts are directly related to his addic-
tion while there are others which are linked in a causal chain. Thus,
whether the "actor" acted as a free agent, that is, whether or not he had
the capacity to control his behavior or conform his conduct to the
requirements of law, becomes a critical consideration.
Secondly, Burger sees the psychiatrist as an expert who should discuss
the defendant's background, drives, motivations, compulsions and be-
havior controls without classifying the defendant in psychological terms.
While criminal responsibility is a jury question, such classification or
psychiatric conclusion might preclude the jury's consideration of evi-
dence.
A discussion of these issues in light of the various proposed tests for
responsibility, when applied to the addict charged with status or second-
ary crimes, should provide a foundation for acquittal. Therefore, it is
arguable that where an addict is charged with status acts (i.e., the use of
drugs or the possession for use) he is entirely within the standards
fective mental condition, was substantially lacking either in his capacity to ap-
preciate that this conduct was wrong or in violation of law, or in his capacity to
conform his conduct to the right or to the requirements of law." The proposal
was not accepted when presented to the Association as a whole.
114. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), in which the
court rejected the Durham rule, but retained the McDonald definition of "mental
disease or defect" which is "any abnormal condition of the mind which sub-
stantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior
controls." 312 F.2d at 851. Brawner also gives an historical summary of the
adoption of the American Law Institute's standard in the other circuits. 471 F.2d
at 979-81. For the text of the ALI formulation, see text accompanying note 71
supra. The Burger formulation stated: "The defendant is not to be found guilty
as charged unless it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that when he com-
mitted the act, first, that he understood and appreciated that the act was a viola-
tion of law, and second, that he had the capacity to exercise his will and to choose
not to do it. If, because of some abnormal mental condition, either of these ele-
ments is lacking, he cannot be found guilty." 288 F.2d at 871 (footnote omitted).
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proposed by Burger and should be acquitted. As to acts other than status
acts, in order for the addict to be acquitted, he must show by some fair
evidentiary standard (possibly the same standard necessary to raise the
issue of insanity) a connection between the act charged and his addic-
tion, which connection is not disproved by the prosecution beyond a
reasonable doubt.
It is evident that this country faces a severe social problem resulting
from the use of narcotic drugs. It is equally obvious that there are prob-
lems created by acquittal under tny of the above tests. Addiction takes
its toll upon the addict as well as upon society which suffers from the
wave of crime and fear caused by the addict's need to maintain his
habit. Obviously, the security of society is essential, and any rule of law
which undermines that security defeats its reason for existence. However,
the security of society does not require that each violator be confined
to prison. As was said in Blocker: "Those who can control conduct are
to be held responsible; those who cannot are relieved but isolated from
society so long as their freedom is the source of danger to themselves or
to society."11 In Freeman the court found that:
Effective procedures for institutionalization and treatment of the criminally irre-
sponsible are vital as an implementation to today's decision. Throughout our
opinion, we have not viewed the choice as one between imprisonment and im-
mediate release. Rather, we believe the true choice to be between different forms
of institutionalization-between the prison and the mental hospital.1' 6
With the substitution of "recognized drug treatment facility" for "mental
hospital," this statement is in accord with the position taken in this
article. This approach can only increase the security of society; witness
Judge Kaufman's position in Freeman that if one who is in fact unable
to control behavior is convicted of a crime:
The result is that instead of being treated at appropriate mental institutions [re-
habilitation centers] for a sufficiently long period to bring about a cure or suffi-
cient improvement so that the accused may return with relative safety to himself
and the community, he is ordinarily sentenced to a prison term as if criminally
responsible and then released as a potential recidivist with society at his mercy."?i
There is another aspect to the problem as well. The Freeman decision
also discusses the role of criminal law.
The criminal law, it has been said, is an expression of the moral sense of the
community. The fact that the law has, for centuries, regarded certain wrong-doers
115. 288 F.2d at 869.
116. 357 F.2d at 626 (footnote omitted).
117. Id. at 618 (footnote omitted).
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as improper subjects for punishment is a testament to the extent to which that
moral sense has developed. Thus, society has recognized . . . that none of the
three asserted purposes of the criminal law-rehabilitation, deterrence and retri-
bution-is satisfied when the truly irresponsible, those who lack substantial ca-
pacity to control their actions, are punished.118
Rehabilitation would be better accomplished in an institution designed
for that purpose. Punishing those who cannot control their behavior and
are by definition undeterrable will not restrain others similarly afflicted.
The desire of society for retribution should not be allowed to "degenerate
into a sadistic form of revenge.""' As Lionel Frankel has said: "Not
only can he [the addict] say, 'I couldn't, at the time of which you com-
plain, have done otherwise,' but he can add: 'What you propose to do to
me, to lock me up in jail as a criminal, is unlikely to strengthen my
ability to do otherwise in the future.' "120
Because certain criminal acts are part of the status of addiction and
because for many addiction-related crimes (secondary acts) the addict
suffers under a severe impairment of behavior controls, it is submitted
that the addict should not suffer criminal penalties for his status acts
or secondary acts.' Rather, for the physical, psychological and moral
well-being of society and the addict himself, society should combat the
social causes of addiction and develop new and more effective methods
of treatment for current victims of the narcotics scourge.
118. Id. at 615 (footnote omitted).
119. Id. at n.21 (footnote omitted). "Revenge" in the words of Francis
Bacon "is a kind of wild justice which the more man's nature runs to, the more
ought law to weed it out." Id.
120. Frankel, supra note 74 at 605.
121. A case currently pending in the D.C. Circuit may resolve the question of
the addict's responsibility for secondary acts. United States v. Moore, Civil No.
71-1252.
